Far Eastern Survey

AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

The Bering Sea Fisheries

The convention of 1952 introduces a new concept designed to allay friction with Japan while preserving the principle of conservation.

BY WILBERT McLEOD CHAPMAN

CONTROVERSIES centering on how the aquatic resources of the Bering Sea should be harvested, and by whom, have disturbed the international climate for upwards of a hundred years. Violence has flared from time to time and has been threatened intermittently at other times. Two of the three great fishery arbitrations have been concerned with the harvesting of Bering Sea resources. At one time or another Russia, Japan, Great Britain, the United States, and Canada have been involved diplomatically one against the other over these problems. The resource in controversy at different periods has been sea otter, fur seal, whales, salmon, and crab.

The uniform source of the trouble has been that the Bering Sea is rich in valuable resources which are rather easy to harvest, the shores of the sea on both sides are sparsely inhabited by peoples who are not much interested in commercial fishing for the world market, and the fishing grounds are roughly equidistant from the great fishing centers of Japan and Vladivostok on the one side, and the Pacific Northwest and British Columbia on the other.

The controversies have been productive not only of discord but of diplomatic and economic developments which have benefited mankind considerably. The two arbitrations contributed a large volume of wise counsel in the complex field of international law concerned with the regime of the high seas, and the concepts developed during these arbitrations have served the international community long and well.

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It was as an outgrowth of one of these controversies, that over the fur seals, that international cooperation in the management and conservation of high seas resources got its first start. Four nations, Japan, Russia, Great Britain, and the United States joined together under treaty to conserve and jointly share in the harvest of fur seals from the area. Under this treaty the fur seal population of the Pribilov Islands grew from a few dozen thousand to more than a million and a half. The crop of fur seal skins taken from the resource increased from little more than nothing to a level of more than 75,000 skins per year. This international cooperation lasted with little or no friction from 1911 to 1941, when Japan abrogated the treaty. The cause of the break then was associated more with supervening political forces which were leading to war than with pressure developing out of the working of the treaty.

The concept of international cooperation in the conservation and management of resources of the high

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seas which got its start here has sent off some remarkably sturdy offshoots. The International Fisheries Commission, established between Canada and the United States to manage the halibut resources of the northeast Pacific Ocean, is an example, as is the International Pacific Salmon Fishery Commission, the International Whaling Commission, the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission, and the International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries. There are few developments in international joint responsibility that have served their function so well and with so little expense or friction as have these joint fishery commissions.

For a long while after 1911 there was peaceful development of resource harvesting on the eastern side of the Bering Sea. Economics did not permit the fishermen of Asia to come so far after fish. The Russians after the Russo-Japanese War and until the end of the second World War did little to develop the Siberian fisheries, and under a series of treaties the development of these rich fisheries was left pretty much in Japanese hands. The fishing energies of the Japanese in northern seas were pretty thoroughly engaged in the development of those Siberian aquatic resources, in particular salmon, and later on crab. In fact it was an outgrowth of internal competition in the Japanese fishing industry which gave rise to the next fishing controversy in the eastern Bering Sea.

The Bristol Bay Controversy

The Japanese government exerted control over the Siberian salmon fishing by letting the different fishing areas out under concession to different Japanese fishing combines. The Siberian salmon fishing developed rather rapidly two different methods of operation. One was shore-based near the river mouths (as the Alaska salmon fisheries were developing at the same time). The other was sea-based on mother ships which, with their auxiliary craft, could move from area to area following the fishing.

By the later 1920s conflict was arising between the Japanese companies operating by these two methods. There were not enough salmon to go around. The offshore operators were intercepting the runs before they came within reach of the shore-based operators. This competition was not only damaging both groups economically, but depleting the salmon stocks upon which both depended. The controversy that arose over this problem within the Japanese government was gradually resolved in favor of the shore-based operators. This left the mother ship operators with fewer and fewer resources to work upon.

In the meanwhile crab fishing and canning using the mother-ship principle had been undergoing development in northern waters. It had spread all along the Siberian side of the Bering Sea (as well as through the Okhotsk Sea) and by the mid-1930s the Japanese crab mother ships were operating rather generally through the Bering Sea. The closer they approached Bristol Bay in Alaska the more salmon they encountered. This appeared to be the logical place to which the Japanese might divert the salmon mother ships that were being crowded out of the Siberian fisheries. In the mid-1930s the Japanese government authorized the outfitting and operation of exploratory salmon-fishing expeditions by mother ships in the eastern Bering Sea.

When this news became public in the United States, citizens of Alaska and the Pacific Northwest states became very much disturbed. As a consequence of the extreme public controversy that was aroused in the United States, the Department of State made strong representations in Tokyo during 1937 and 1938. Relations between Japan and the United States were already touchy. In order to relieve the international tension the Japanese government, while pointedly reserving all of its rights under international law to fish everywhere on the high seas, rescinded all licenses for Japanese nationals to fish for salmon in the eastern Bering Sea. This step did remove this point of contention between the two nations and no further controversy over the eastern Bering Sea fisheries developed until about 1950.

By that time a number of striking shifts had taken place in the international scene and their effects had been felt in several phases of the Bering Sea fishery problems. Russia had completely reclaimed her Siberian fisheries for her own use by excluding Japanese fishermen from her waters. She had gained also the rich fisheries of the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin. The Russian industry in Siberia was fully occupied with the development of these huge fisheries, a situation which still obtains and probably will for some years to come. This removed the possibility of Russian penetration into the fisheries of eastern Bering Sea.

Japan's Postwar Problem

The elimination of Japan from the Siberian, Kurile, and Sakhalin fisheries left her northern fishermen with no place to fish. A large part of the population of Hokkaido and scores of thousands of inhabitants of the northern Honshu ports had been dependent upon these fisheries for a livelihood. They were accustomed to, and trained in, these rugged and specialized northern fisheries. Their energies could not readily be transferred to the temperate and tropical fisheries remaining to Japan, which were also crowded. The fisheries in which their energies could be most readily and quickly employed were those of the Bering Sea and adjacent waters, re-

moved far enough from Russian jurisdiction to prevent capture of their vessels by Russia—an all too frequent occurrence in the postwar years. This was a condition which was readily appreciated on both sides of the North Pacific. So were the postwar facts that Japan had quickly been transformed from a vigorous enemy to a needy, and needed, friend, while Russia had changed even more from a war-time ally to an implacable foe.

International Conservation Machinery

In the years which had intervened between 1920 and 1950 there had grown up a complicated and comprehensive network of conservation agencies charged with the conservation of all important fishery resources along the Pacific Coast of North America north of Mexico, and international conservation agencies were being devised to guard the fishery resources south along the Americas to the equator.

The three western states had banded together under Congressional authority in the Pacific Marine Fisheries Commission to act jointly on conservation problems of common concern. Each of the three states, Canada in British Columbia, and the United States government in Alaska, had each with their own independent research agencies and conservation agencies brought under conservation regulation one after another of the important local fisheries. Where citizens of the two countries were involved in the same fishery needing conservation control the two countries had formed joint commissions under treaty to jointly investigate and manage the resource. The joint halibut fishery was administered by the International Fisheries Commission. The joint sockeye salmon fisheries of the Fraser River were administered by the International Pacific Salmon Fisheries Commission. There was general consultation along the coast among research personnel and fishery administrators. Much conservation management was accomplished by such informal consultation without respect to nationality, and without the necessity of formal treaty relationships. Economic conditions in western Canada and the United States were near enough the same so that such free and easy conservation cooperation placed no undue hardship on the fishermen of either nation.

All or nearly all of these conservation agencies had advisory boards from the affected industry working with them on an intimate basis of consultation. In some cases these advisory boards were appointed under law; in other cases the agency had simply appointed a board because such a mechanism had been shown to work with much practical success for the pioneer International Fisheries Commission. Before conservation regulations were enacted the appropriate advisory board passed upon them as being needed and the most practical means to accomplish the required results.

As a consequence of these activities all of the major and many of the minor fisheries between Nome, Alaska, and San Diego, California, had been brought under conservation regulation. There was little, if any, overfishing in any large fishery along the coast. All the questionable cases were being closely observed by scientists and the legal machinery to put into effect and enforce the needed regulations was all ready to put in action when the scientists determined what was needed. The fisheries were in good shape and were being run on the basis of maximum sustained production from each stock.

The theory behind all these regulations was that if the fisherman would restrain his efforts a little this year his efforts would be rewarded by greater catches next year, and the year after, than would be the case if he caught as heavily as he could this year. This was satisfactory to the fishermen. What they gave up they profited by. The fisherman had become the husbander of the resource he harvested, as the herdsman husbanded his grassland, the farmer his topsoil, and the forester his trees.

Fishermen Gravely Concerned

But what happened to this situation if foreign fishermen, that is, Japanese, came in now and reaped the stored-up reward? The fishermen of both Canada and the United States were outraged at the very thought. It was the same as if you had been putting away your savings year by year in a bank and suddenly found that a stranger could come in and draw freely upon your account.

The conservation agencies were equally concerned. The practical effect of their work, of which they were most proud (no other such extensive nexus of conservation administration over marine fisheries exists elsewhere in the world) depended upon cooperation from the fishermen. Were these years of careful scientific research and cautious husbanding of resources to become of no avail?

The development of the diesel engine, mechanical refrigeration, and other technical advances had removed the shield of distance under which these conservation schemes had rooted and grown. The Bering Sea or Bristol Bay problem had expanded geographically and become the North Pacific problem. The fishermen knew full well that the Japanese mother ships could work practically on the Bristol Bay salmon runs and on the richly provided halibut banks of the Gulf of Alaska and of British Columbia, and probably in many other fisheries along the way.

To the fishermen of North America there appeared to be only two practical alternatives to bring to the

solution of this problem: (1) devise a means of keeping the Japanese out of their conserved fisheries or (2) knock aside the conservation regulations and harvest the savings of years quickly before the Japanese got to them. If the abundance of fish on the banks was driven down (as the Japanese had done to their own resources) the Japanese could not afford to come this far for the harvest. The only thing that would attract the Japanese to these distant waters was the artificially high abundance of fish kept to that level by self-restraining conservation regulations. Withdraw this and you withdrew the incentive.

The 1952 Convention

The strength of the fishermen's plea and logic, backed by the conservation agencies, reached Ottawa and Washington and was transmitted by them to Tokyo. There resulted conversations and negotiations, held in Tokyo late in 1951. In the delegations were representatives of the fishermen and conservation agencies as well as diplomats. All participants from the three nations were imbued with the necessity of working out a friendly and statesmanlike solution to the problem of providing for the expansion of Japanese fisheries in the North Pacific without upsetting the careful conservation management of the coastal fisheries of North America. The result was the International Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean, signed by the representatives of Japan, Canada, and the United States of America.[1]

This convention marks an important new step forward in the conservation of international fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean. Under it Japan becomes a joint partner with the United States and Canada in cooperative measures to preserve and perpetuate the fish stocks of the North Pacific. It introduces an important new concept to such practices. Each signatory agreed to abstain from the harvesting of specified fish stocks which are already being harvested to the maximum by one or both of the other parties, provided that the latter are carrying out programs for the conservation of the stocks and agree to continue to do so.[2] The convention establishes a Commission in which each of the parties has one vote. To this commission is given the authority to examine into the condition of the different fish stocks of the North Pacific, to keep them under continual review, to recommend to the nations conservation regulations when needed, and to recommend abstention from a fully developed fishery by one or more of the parties under conditions carefully listed in the convention. The fairness of the convention's terms and the appointment of a Commission which will prevent fisheries problems among the three nations from becoming large political crises before being brought to solution should result in a long era of peace in the Bering Sea and the North Pacific.

Perhaps the problems of Bering Sea have once more enforced the evolution of a concept which will prove to be useful elsewhere in the world.

The international community, as well as most of its individual nations and their competent political entities has learned from long experience that there is only one way to get humans of any race, or stage of civilization, to conserve replaceable resources. That is to give them a proprietary right in those resources. What one owns and can pass along to one's descendants one is more careful with. This concept of private property is the keystone to Western and most other civilizations. It works. It has not, prior to this time, been applied to the resources in the international common of the high seas. And its application there will not be accomplished easily or without travail.

Significance of New Concept

But as the world's population presses more hardly upon the food resources of the land the food resources of the sea begin to assume a new importance to the international community. New technological advances make the wasteful overharvesting of marine resources more easy of accomplishment and good prices for fish, coupled with greater efficiency in the fleet, make the incentive to hard fishing greater everywhere. One after another the great fisheries of the world have approached or are approaching the point where a little careful husbanding will guard their productivity and perpetuate it. Mankind will find that those who husband the resources of the sea, like those who husband the resources of the land, must be permitted the fruits of their labor and forbearance.

This is the new concept that this convention puts forth. Only time will tell how it will work out. But the diplomats, fishermen, and conservation experts who gave their thoughts and energy in an atmosphere of good will during the negotiation of a most difficult and complex set of problems have brought forth a statesmanlike document which should serve well not only their principals, but the international community as well.

And so we may hope that peace will reign for another long period in Bering Sea, as it did after the treaty of 1911 resolved the fur seal problem.

1 The convention was signed in Tokyo on May 9, 1952. For text see *Department of State Bulletin*, March 3, 1952, p. 343, and May 26, 1952, p. 830.—Ed.

2 Japan agrees not to fish for halibut and herring in specified waters off the coast of North America, and Japan and Canada agree not to fish for salmon in a specified area of the Bering Sea.—Ed.

Railway Construction in China

Communists strive to restore and to extend the country's railway network.

BY LI CHANG

DURING THE PAST THREE YEARS investments in railway rehabilitation and construction in Communist China have been the largest single item of the national expenditure on industry and communications. All railways damaged during the war were repaired in a remarkably short time. Several lines begun by the Nationalists have been completed by the Communists, and some new construction has been undertaken.

The strategic and economic importance of such improvements and additions to the national railway network is obvious. It is, however, difficult to obtain reliable information from Communist China. The data summarized below have been taken in part from releases of the (Communist) New China News Agency, and in part from other sources. They cover the following topics: (1) rehabilitation, (2) railways completed in 1951-52, (3) new railways under construction, and (4) projected railways.

Repair and Rehabilitation

In 1949 alone the Railway Engineering Corps of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) is reported to have restored over 5,000 miles of railway and 2,715 bridges. By the end of 1949, about 13,020 miles of railway were in full operation. On July 1, 1951 all railway lines on the mainland and Hainan Island, with a total length of 16,740 miles, had resumed full service. The railways from Tientsin to Mukden, Mukden to Harbin, and Mukden to Antung are reported to have been double-tracked. In the work of rehabilitation, considerable assistance and materials were received from the Soviet Union.

In the interests of improving efficiency, special attention was given to the rehabilitation of railway bridges. Especially noteworthy was the strengthening of the Liu Kiang bridge (1,942 feet), connecting the Hunan-Kwangsi and Kwangsi-Kweichow railways. The Huai River bridge and the Yellow River bridge on the Tientsin-Pukow railway, as well as the Chientang River bridge, were repaired and strengthened. The reinforcement of the three-mile Yellow River bridge on the Peking-Hankow railway deserves special mention. This was built by French and Belgian engineers 52 years ago, and when crossing it, trains had to be divided and hauled by light locomotives at low speed. Reinforcement was carried on gradually without interrupting normal traffic, and by November 1952 all trains were able to pass over the bridge at full speed.

Efforts have also been made to improve operating efficiency, with a nation-wide drive for full loads, greater hauls, and an average daily run of 500 kilometers per locomotive.

Railways Built or Rebuilt in 1951-52

With the railway network resuming full service, the Communists launched a program of construction in the summer of 1950. So far, five lines are said to have been completed: two in the southwest, two in the north, and one in the northwest. In each case the Communists followed the original plan of construction laid down by the Nationalists.

Liuchow-Chennankwan line. This is the southern section of the Hunan-Kwangsi railway, a trunk line built during the war and projected originally to connect south China with French Indochina. The two northern sections between Hengyang and Kweilin (224 miles) and between Kweilin and Liuchow (108 miles) were completed in 1938 and 1939 respectively. The two southern sections, Liuchow to Nanning (163 miles) and Nanning to Chennankwan on the Indochina border (140 miles) were partly completed at the time that Japanese troops occupied Nanning, in November 1939. Although China recaptured Nanning in December 1940, the Nationalists decided to suspend construction in view of the uncertainties of the war situation. Only a 43-mile section from Liuchow to Laipin and a 35-mile branch line from Laipin to Chienkiang were built in order to obtain coal from this area.

Because of the strategic importance of this line, construction from Laipin was started by the Communists in October 1950. Rails and ties were transported not only from Canton and Hengyang workshops, but even from Manchuria. More than 100,000 drafted peasants, together with other workers and the Railway Engineering Corps, were engaged in laying the tracks at the rate of 5.46 kilometers per team per day. On March 10, 1951 the 123-mile section from Laipin to Nanning was opened to traffic. From Nanning to Chennankwan the terrain is very difficult, but the line was built from both ends simultaneously, completed within eleven months, and opened to traffic on November 7, 1951.

Chennankwan is one of the most important passes between China and Indochina, and a major supply route for the Viet Minh forces in their struggle against the French. Since the early months of 1952 military

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transportation is said to have been carried on at night, and an airfield has been built to protect the railway from possible French air raids.

Chengtu-Chungking line. Work on this line, from Chungking on the Yangtze to Chengtu, the capital of Szechwan province, was begun before the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war, and a large part of the foundation work had been completed by the Nationalists. As early as 1940 important work had been finished on the section between Chungking and Neikiang, the sugar center of Szechwan. The line forms part of a projected trunk railway connecting northwest and southwest China.

The Communists began construction on June 15, 1950. On July 1, 1951 train service started on the 102-mile section from Chungking to Yungchuan. On December 7, 1951 traffic was opened to Neikiang, 175 miles from Chungking, and on July 1, 1952 the whole length of the line, a distance of 313 miles, was open to traffic.

The cost of construction was low as the road was built entirely with native materials by Chinese workers and engineers. In addition to 25,000 men from the PLA, 100,000 drafted workers were engaged in the work, which required 40 tunnels and 970 bridges. Construction went on day and night, and a new record of laying five kilometers of rail per day was set. Since the job was hastily done, part of the roadbed was entirely washed away after a heavy rain, and train service was interrupted from August 26 to September 11, 1952.

Linking the rich Chengtu plain with Chungking, where the Yangtze and Chialing Rivers meet, this railway may produce a great change in the economic life of the whole southwest, including Sikang and Tibet. The province of Szechwan is especially rich in natural resources. With the completion of this railway, a transport network has been centered around it which has greatly increased commodity exchange in the area.

Lunghai Line Extended

Tienshui-Lanchow line. This new line is the westernmost extension of the Lunghai trunk line, which stretches 1,083 miles westward from Haichow on the China Sea. Before construction could be started, rehabilitation of the 103-mile Paoki-Tienshui sector had to be undertaken. This section of the Lunghai line was begun in May 1939, but because of the difficulty of importing materials during the war, progress was very slow. The route passes over high mountains and deep gorges, and more than 520 bridges and culverts had to be built. It was not opened to traffic until December 1945. Since it was poorly built, rehabilitation was started by the Communists in November 1949. The entire roadbed was improved, and the most difficult section, with 126 tunnels in thirteen miles, was reinforced. This prepared the way for the construction of the Tienshui-Lanchow line.

Actual construction of the latter began in May 1950, but went slowly, owing to the mountainous nature of the terrain. By December 1, 1951 only 40 miles were ready for service. By August 23, 1952, however, trains were pulling into Lanchow, having covered a distance of 215 miles, and the formal opening to traffic took place on October 1.

Traversing the Lunghan ranges, which tower over 9,900 feet above sea level, this railway is said to be an achievement of modern engineering. Tunnels totaling more than six miles had to be dug, the longest more than 6,500 feet in length. More than 1,000 bridges had to be built and many complex engineering problems had to be solved. The problem of supply also presented difficulties. Millions of tons of building materials had to be brought from other parts of the country, while drinking water, food, and fuel had to be provided from centers miles away. Like the Chengtu-Chungking line, this railway was built entirely with domestic materials and labor. In addition to civilian workers, 100,000 men from the PLA performed 3,450,000 man-days of work in 1950 and 1951, while in 1952 another 9,000 workers joined in the construction.

Lanchow, now the western terminus of the Lunghai railroad, is the key economic center of northwest China. Through it the products of Sinkiang, Chinghai, Ninghsia, and Kansu provinces can flow to other areas in exchange for industrial goods. The completion of this railroad has therefore given an impetus to the economy of the whole northwest region.

Northern section of Shansi railway. The Shansi (Tung-Pu) railway traverses the province of Shansi from Tatung in the north to Puchow in the south, facing Tungkwan on the other side of the Yellow River. It was completed before the Sino-Japanese war, but during the war the entire line, 613 miles in length, fell into the hands of the Japanese army. The Japanese widened the northern section from meter to standard gauge, and also widened the railway from Taiyuan to Shihkiachwang on the Peking-Hankow railway, in order to facilitate the movement of their troops. They also built the Yuanping-Shuo Hsien section, which was opened to traffic on December 10, 1939.

During the civil war the Chinese Communists, after their military occupation of Tatung and other nearby points, completely destroyed this 64-mile section in order to prevent General Yen Hsi-shan from attacking them in the rear. In the autumn of 1950 they began to rebuild the line which they themselves had destroyed in 1945-46. Disrupted for six years, traffic along the whole line was resumed on July 1, 1951. Since then



SKETCH MAP OF CHINESE RAILWAYS

——— Completed by Communists. .... Projected.

the Tung-Pu railway has been linked up again with the Peking-Paotow line at Tatung, and with the Lunghai railway at Tungkwan.

Chinchow-Chengteh line. In order to link Jehol with the railway network of Manchuria, the Japanese, shortly after the Mukden incident, built a railway connecting Chinchow with Chengteh, the capital of Jehol, a distance of some 200 miles. This line was completed in 1936. Two years later, Chengteh was brought into direct rail communication with Peking.

After V-J Day the Russians spread out over Manchuria and deep into the provinces of Jehol and Chahar. On the heels of the Russian evacuation in May 1946 the Chinese Communists advanced, helping themselves to territory and munitions left by the Japanese. But when Chengteh fell before a Nationalist drive, the Communists again adopted the strategy of disrupting Nationalist communications, and thoroughly wrecked the entire railway.

Rebuilding was begun by the Communists in March 1952. A construction team composed of over 5,000 railway workers and 4,000 drafted peasants built 3,000 feet of bridges and 610 feet of tunnels and culverts. The reconstruction of the line was completed in October.

As the province of Jehol abounds in coal, iron, petroleum, copper, lead, and mica, this renovated line will help to exploit the resources of the area, and its cotton and other products can be exchanged for the industrial products of Manchuria.

A 90-mile branch of the Chingchow-Chengteh railway to Chihfeng (Hata), also built by the Japanese, was likewise demolished during the civil war. Steps to rebuild it were begun in October and finished in November 1952. Extending into the heart of Jehol on the border of the "Autonomous Territory of Inner Mongolia," this railway will help to open up the rich resources of the northern part of the province.

Railways Under Construction

In the construction of new railways, the Chinese Communists are following closely the plans laid down by the Nationalists, with special emphasis on the southwestern and northwestern provinces. Four new lines are now under construction, two in the southwest, one in the west and one in the northwest.

Nanning-Yamchow line. To extend her influence in southwest China, France was for some time interested in building a railway from Yamchow to Chungking, for which she had been given a priority right. The Nanning-Yamchow railway, a distance of 125 miles, is the southern section of this route. Leading directly to the South China Sea, this line was strongly recommended by Dr. Sun Yat-sen in his program for a southwestern railway system. It provides another outlet to the sea for the railways of southwest China. For economic and military reasons, the Chinese Communists have rapidly laid the rails as far as Lungmen Harbor. When completed, this road will serve as another supply line for the Viet Minh forces in Indochina.

Linking the Southwest Provinces

Kunming-Kweiyang line. Kunming in Yunnan province is the terminus of the 289-mile Yunnan-Indochina railway. Early in 1936 a priority was granted to a French syndicate to extend this line to Kweiyang in Kweichow province, which would permit the products of southwest China to be swiftly transported to Indochina, and greatly increase the business of the port of Haiphong. Owing to the outbreak of war with Japan and the consequent suspension of work on the Hunan-Kweichow railway, this project was also abandoned. The construction of both lines, now projected by the Chinese Communists, together with the Chungking-Kweiyang line, would knit the provinces of Szechwan, Yunnan, Kweichow, and Hunan into one economic unit, and would, in addition, provide a direct rail route from southwest China all the way to Manchuria.

Chengtu-Tiensui line. This 469-mile line, linking Chengtu in Szechwan with the Lunghai railroad, was decided on by the Nationalists in 1939, in preference to the more difficult route from Chengtu to Paoki. Field surveys were completed while the war with Japan was going on. Eighteen miles of tunnels will be required. The Communists intend to give priority to this route, in order to link the southwest with the northwest. Another engineering survey was undertaken in January 1951, and construction was begun on July 1, 1952, the day that the Chengtu-Chungking road was completed. The first section of 112 miles, across flat country, is expected to be finished within a year. The next 104 miles are through rolling country, while most of the final 253-mile stretch is through difficult mountainous terrain. When completed, this road will give access to the coal, minerals, and oil of China's northwest, which has great possibilities for industrial development.

Lanchow-Sinkiang line. The main object of this northwest artery is to carry the railway system into the heart of Sinkiang and ultimately establish a link with the Turkestan-Siberia (Turksib) railway in central Asia. Started on October 1, 1952, this important line will extend from Lanchow through the Kansu corridor, via the Yumen oil district to Tihwa (Urumchi), the capital of Sinkiang province, a distance of more than 1,500 miles. The route passes through difficult terrain with high mountains and steep passes. Hence railway construction must be preceded by highway building to facilitate transport of materials. It is reported that surveying parties are now strung out at frequent intervals

for some 250 miles ahead of the actual railway construction, and that the survey work on the 850-mile Lanchow-Kiuchuan sector is nearing completion.

At the other end of the line, it is said that engineering surveys between Tihwa and Tacheng (450 miles) have been completed and that construction has actually started from Tachen southward to Tihwa. Although no information has been released, it is possible that the Russians have built a branch line from Sergiopol to Tachen, thus making it possible for the Chinese to continue the line from Tacheng to Tihwa via Wusu, an oil center in northwestern Sinkiang. This is expected to be the main junction point, from which one road will extend to Sergiopol and another to Alma Ata.

According to an unconfirmed source from Communist China, a Sino-Soviet agreement was signed in December 1950 providing for the construction of the Lanchow-Sinkiang railway. No such agreement has been made public, but it seems likely that the Russian and Chinese Communists are anxious to connect their transportation systems in this way as well as to penetrate this unexploited region, although the difficulties of the project will make its construction a protracted affair extending over a period of years.

Tatung-Fengtai line. In north China, a cutoff is now under construction from Tatung on the Tientsin-Paotow railway to Fengtai, the junction of the Peking-Mukden and Peking-Hankow lines. This would make it possible to transport coal from Tatung to Mukden, Tientsin, or Hankow without breaking up the trains at Nankow Pass.

Projected Railways

The Communists have announced a five-year plan of building 200,000 kilometers of railways in China, but they face tremendous difficulties owing to the serious shortage of steel rails. Engineering surveys are reported to have been completed on the following lines, which will be built as soon as finances permit, with priority given to four lines in the southwest and two in the north and northwest, as noted below.

Hunan-Kweichow line. This 620-mile line, a westward extension of the Chekiang-Kiangsi (Hangchow-Chuchow) railway, would when completed form part of the most important east-west trunk line south of the Yangtze River. Its construction was begun by the Nationalists early in 1937, and after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war some 150 miles were finished. After Hankow fell to the Japanese in 1938 the project was abandoned, parts of the completed sections were dismantled, and the materials from them were used in building the Kweilin-Liuchow section of the Hunan-Kwangsi railway, which made a significant contribution to China's war effort. This abandoned prewar project is now being revived by the Communists. After survey work was completed in August 1950, it was decided to build the section from Kweiyang southeastward to Tuyun, from where the line is to run northeastward to Chuchow on the Canton-Hankow railway.

New Lines to Szechwan

Chungking-Kweiyang line. In order to link the province of Szechwan with other southwestern provinces, the Chinese Communists are reported to be ready to revive the old project of building a railway from Chungking southward to Kweiyang, a distance of 303 miles. This, together with other projected lines, would form an important artery connecting China's northwest and southwest.

Szechwan-Yunnan line. A railway from Kunming, the capital of Yunnan province, to Suifu on the Yangtze, in Szechwan, a distance of 528 miles, was projected in the early years of the war. Though this road would have been vitally important to China's war effort, the engineering work was seriously hampered by lack of imported materials following the French capitulation to the Japanese in Indochina. One section of the line was opened to traffic in 1941, but another was torn up to prevent the Japanese from invading Yunnan. As the roadbed was completed as far as Weining and culverts and bridges had been constructed, it should not be difficult for the Communists to complete the task. This route runs through a region rich in mineral resources—coal, iron, and copper—, and its construction would pave the way for their rapid development.

Kwangtung-Kwangsi line. Continuing the 30-mile Canton-Samshui railway, this projected line runs in a northwesterly direction for over 300 miles, and will be linked at Liuchow with the Kweichow-Kwangsi railway. Its completion, together with that of other projected routes, would make it possible to travel by rail from Canton to Chengtu, as well as providing direct communication between Kwangtung and Kwangsi. This line, which passes through districts noted for antimony and coal deposits, was never surveyed by the Nationalists, but the Communists recently completed a survey of the route.

Paotow-Lanchow line. This route was projected thirty years ago as an extension of the Peking-Paotow railway. Under the Communist regime, an engineering survey was completed in 1951. The construction of this 680-mile line would link together the provinces of Suiyuan, Ninghsia, and Kansu and bring them into closer economic contact with the rest of China.

Kweisui-Ulan Bator line. In August-September 1952 the Soviet Union was instrumental in bringing about the conclusion of an agreement on economic and cultural cooperation between China and Outer Mongolia.

Initiated at Moscow in the course of Russo-Chinese talks in which the Premier of Outer Mongolia was summoned to participate, the agreement was finally signed at Peking on October 4, 1952. Unpublished parts of the agreement were reported to include clauses providing for the establishment of a Sino-Mongolian Railway Company to build a southern branch of the Trans-Siberian, crossing Outer Mongolia and the Gobi Desert to Kweisui, the capital of Suiyuan province, on the Tientsin-Paotow railway. As the line from Ulan Ude in Russia to Ulan Bator in Outer Mongolia has already been built, the new company's job would be to construct the line on to Kweisui, thus linking the "Mongolian People's Republic" with the "People's Republic of China." Russian materials and Russian experts will be used, it is reported. This line, if completed, would open up a new region to economic development as well as providing a strategic transport link between Communist China and the Soviet Union.

At present, Communist China has only one rail link with Russia, through Manchuria. The construction of another line through Mongolia, together with the projected line through central Asia mentioned above, would provide three lines of rail communication. The difficulties of construction are, however, considerable.

It is evident from the above survey that a good start has been made in railway development in Communist China. But the effects of shortages of materials and the strain imposed by the Korean war are indicated by the fact that only 800 kilometers of new lines are planned for 1953. The realization of the many plans described above will therefore depend on whether conditions are favorable for overall economic development of the country.

India's Five-Year Plan: The Final Draft

Bombay, February 1953

IN JULY 1951, when the Draft Outline of the Indian Five-Year Plan[1] was presented to the public, the National Planning Commission stated: "We have . . . felt it necessary, before presenting our proposals in complete detail, to offer a Draft Outline of the Plan. The Draft is intended to be a document for widest possible discussion. . . . "

Since its publication numerous persons and organizations as well as the press have expressed themselves on the proposals in the Draft Outline. The National Planning Commission has met with various members of the central and state governments and with representatives of the principal political parties. These consultations and discussions have been taken into consideration in drawing up the final plan, which was presented by Prime Minister Nehru to both houses of Parliament on December 8, 1952.

The Plan as now presented contains all of the development projects included in the Draft Outline, together with a number of additions and changes. These changes have been made to strengthen the Plan at those points at which it was felt that the proposals made in the Draft Outline fell short of the needs of the country.

The total amount of investment has been increased by about 15 percent. The Draft Outline was divided into two parts, the first involving an expenditure of $3,145 million and the second proposing an outlay of about $600 million, which was to be undertaken if external assistance were available. In the final report the Plan no longer consists of two parts. The various programs have been brought together into a single plan, and the total outlay is estimated at $4,344 million.

The broad allocations among the main heads of development in the final Plan as compared with the Draft Outline are indicated in the accompanying table. In the field of agriculture and commodity development additional programs have been introduced with a view to ensuring that the targets of agricultural production will be reached. These include a provision of $189 million for Community Development Projects, $63 million for additional minor irrigation programs, and a scheme for the establishment of a National Extension Organization.

The Community Development Project is the method by which the Indian government hopes to bring the Plan down to the village level. By the use of village-level workers the government will endeavor to raise the enthusiasm of the people. The main lines of activities in a Community Project are agriculture and related matters; communications; education; health; supplementary employment; housing; and training in social welfare.

Each project contains about 300 villages with a total area of 450 to 500 square miles, a cultivated area of about 150,000 acres, and a population of about 200,000. The unit is continually subdivided until we finally arrive at a unit of five villages which are handled by one village-level worker. The present program includes 65 projects and it will reach about 15 million villagers.

The Commission has gone a long way in defining proposals for land reform, which in the Draft Outline were very ambiguous. The Commission states that the goal of its land policy is to be cooperative farming societies. They hope to achieve this goal by limiting the size of holdings; giving ownership of the land to those

1 See H. W. Singer, "India's Five-Year Plan: A Modest Proposal," *Far Eastern Survey*, June 18, 1952; V. K. R. V. Rao, "India's First Five Year Plan—A Descriptive Analysis," *Pacific Affairs*, March 1952.

ALLOCATIONS IN INDIAN FIVE-YEAR PLAN
(in millions of dollars)

	Outlay in 1951-1956			*Percentage of total*		
	Final Plan	*Draft*	*Change*	*Final Plan*	*Draft*	*Change*
Agriculture and community development	756.9	402.5	+354.4	17.4	12.8	+4.6
Irrigation and power	1,179.0	945.8	+233.2	27.2	30.0	—2.8
Transportation and communication	1,043.9	815.1	+228.9	24.0	26.1	—2.1
Industry	363.4	212.1	+151.3	8.4	6.7	+1.7
Social services	713.6	533.9	+179.7	16.64	17.0	—0.36
Rehabilitation	178.5	165.9	+ 12.6	4.1	5.3	—1.2
Miscellaneous	109.2	59.9	+ 49.2	2.5	1.9	+0.6
Total	4,344.4	3,135.1	+1,209.3	100.0	100.0	

who work it; and ensuring that rents are equitable. It has been suggested that no individual should own more than three family holdings.[2] Land in excess of this amount is to be sold to the tenants at a multiple of rental values and payments are to be made over a period. In cases where a person owns three or less family holdings he has an option of five years to either resume cultivation of his own land or else sell it to the tenants under the conditions mentioned above. In cases where the tenants will continue to work the land the main consideration in fixing rent will be to see that the cultivator has a fair wage for himself. The Commission has suggested that a rent rate exceeding one-fourth or one-fifth of the produce could well be regarded as requiring special justification.

The industrial section of the Plan has been strengthened too. In the public sector, a provision has been made for the establishment of an integrated steel plant and for setting up basic industries such as the manufacture of heavy electrical equipment and fertilizers. To provide increased transport facilities required for industrial and mineral development, a provision of $63 million has been made.

For the private sector, special development programs for about 40 industries have been prepared by the Commission in cooperation with the Ministry of Commerce and Industry and after full discussion with representatives of individual industries.[3]

ROBERT F. MEAGHER

Mr. Meagher, a graduate of the Yale Law School, is in India on a fellowship to study economic conditions.

2 A family holding is defined as being equivalent, according to local conditions and the existing conditions of technique, either to a plough unit or to a work unit for a family of average size working with such assistance as is customary in agricultural operations.

3 These development schemes are in a special volume issued by the Planning Commission, which has not yet been made available to the public.

BOOKS ON THE PACIFIC AREA

LAND AND SOCIETY IN MALABAR. By Adrian C. Mayer. Bombay: Geoffrey Cumberlege (Oxford University Press), 1952. vii, 158 pp. Rs. 7.

Malabar is a district of Madras state in India. The author of this book says that the changes that are taking place there are, to some extent, representative of recent trends in India as a whole. This is no doubt true. We may add that Malabar attracts the attention of the student of social sciences for other reasons as well. Situated on the southwest coast of India and separated from the eastern parts of the country by the Western Ghats, it has had an independent, though not an isolated, growth. It has its own language, Malayalam; the Kathakali dance, the artistic expression of its people, is unique. Its system of land tenure and the inheritance and marriage laws of a good number of its people are different from those in the rest of India.

The complex nature of the land tenure system is dealt with at length in this book. First there is the landlord, then the tenant, the subtenant, and the landless laborer. Before the application of the British legal system strong conventions gave some important rights to the tenants and the landlord's obligations to society in general were also strictly fulfilled. During the early stages of the British administration the rights of the landlords took a new shape, much to the detriment of others. In the nineteen-twenties and thirties newer laws, favoring the tenants, were passed and implemented.

The rigid caste system made the social structure very complex, and it rarely yields to an analysis by a foreigner. Mr. Mayer is very successful in describing it at length and in examining some of the recent legislation connected with land tenure. His account of social conventions, food habits, festivals, the joint family, and many other aspects of village life provides valuable information. It is also so interesting that the reviewer, a Malayali, became homesick when he read it.

One feels, however, that the author has not fully comprehended the nature and scope of some of the changes in social outlook that have occurred recently in Malabar. As a result his passing references to government policies and

the success and failure of the Communists are highly misleading. As the author himself observes, these were only his impressions and did not come within the framework of his main topic of research. Perhaps they ought not to have been included in the book.

In addition to the subjects mentioned above there are two chapters dealing with agricultural practices and the history of the people. Though some parts of it may create controversy, the book is well written and, in its own field, is valuable not only to a foreigner but to many Indians, including the Malayalis themselves.

Indian Council of World Affairs K. P. KARANAKARAN

CHRISTIAN INFLUENCE UPON THE IDEOLOGY OF THE TAIPING REBELLION, 1851-1854. By Eugene Powers Boardman. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1952. xi, 188 pp. $2.00.

Mr. Boardman's book is a valuable contribution to the study of Christian influence upon the Taiping ideology. His method of discovering what the Taipings took, by comparing the terms and ideas found in their religious writings with the presumed source, yields fruitful results. The chapter on "What the Taipings Failed to Take" is of great value. But in evaluating the Taipings' understanding of Christianity, Mr. Boardman seems to have set up a standard too high even for some real Christians. This weakens rather than strengthens his sound conclusion that "The Taiping religion . . . was not Christianity" (p. 114).

Mr. Boardman makes a number of keen observations; e. g., he notes "the Taipings' attempt to anchor in Chinese traditions as many of the new theological and revolutionary ideas as possible" (p. 36). He is particularly right in stating that the Christian component built up morale and discipline and thus contributed to the military success of the Taipings. It served as "an effective instrument of mass control" (pp. 120-121). But because of popular opposition to iconoclasm and because of the fact that "their creed was entirely foreign to Chinese ideology" (p. 125) "it is possible that the Christian part of the ideology handicapped the Rebellion as much as it helped it" (p. 126).

The book, though excellent, suffers from some minor defects which, however, do not affect the validity of its main contentions. It was Emperor Hui (A.D. 1101-1125) and not "Huan" of the Sung who gave the highest deity in the Taoist pantheon the designation Shang-ti (p. 68). That the Taipings attempted to modify an earlier anti-Christian position (p. 35) may be said of Hung Jen-kan, not of the Taiping leaders as a whole. This is evident from the fact that they dropped all Confucian quotations in the later editions of their documents. It is not true that "nowhere in all Taiping literature is there an attempt to transliterate the name Mary" (p. 79). It is found in Hung's comment on Chapter 13 of the Gospel according to St. John. Dragon, in China, is not conceived to be identical in symbolic connotation with serpent. Mr. Boardman's acceptance of Chien Yu-wen's theory that Hung was a Kung-yang scholar and received his teaching from Chu Chiu-chiang (p. 116) is uncritical. There is no evidence to support it except hearsay and loose logic. In many cases, Mr. Boardman's translation of Chinese sources is not quite correct.

Mr. Boardman relies heavily on Chien Yu-wen. He might have been wiser to consult Lo Erh-kang, definitely a greater scholar. Although Lo's work, *An Outline of Taiping Tien-kuo*, is mentioned in the "Biographical Appendix," he is not referred to in the text. But as a whole the book is a valuable addition to the literature on the Taiping ideology.

University of Washington VINCENT Y. C. SHIH

JAPAN PAST AND PRESENT. By Edwin O. Reischauer. Rev. ed. New York: Knopf, 1953. xi, 292, xi pp. $2.85.

This book, originally published in 1947, is a little masterpiece of condensation. For the student it provides an invaluable introduction to the intricacies of Japanese history from the earliest times. For the layman it outlines, in broad yet precise and vivid strokes, the historical and cultural roots of a great Oriental nation whose fortunes have been so closely linked with those of the United States. It is an absorbing story, and although Japan's pre-modern history is so different from that of any Western nation, it offers some striking parallels to Western experience.

In this new edition the political history of the 1920s and 1930s has been expanded and somewhat revised. Three new chapters evaluate the changes wrought by the occupation, bring the story down to date, and briefly survey the present and future. A chronology and reading list have also been added. Some of us who served in SCAP would not claim quite so much for it as Professor Reischauer does. But for those who think his view of Japan's political progress too optimistic, he has a disarming comment: "I admit," he says, "to being impressed by the more hopeful tendencies in recent Japanese history, but I am impressed by them just because I am acutely conscious of all that has stood and still stands in their way." M. S. F.

HONGKONG: THE ISLAND BETWEEN. By Christopher Rand. New York: Knopf, 1952. 244 pp. $3.00.

Perceptive and charmingly written impressions of Hongkong, Macao, and—at one remove—Communist China, by a reporter to whom politics is only one of many aspects of the human scene. Living on the edge of a revolution, Mr. Rand remains calm and urbane. His vignettes have the merit of being, to use his own word, three-dimensional, and his analysis of the methods of both Chinese Nationalist and Chinese Communist propaganda is enough to make the newspaper reader take all press stories emanating from Hongkong with a liberal sprinkling of salt. M. S. F.

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